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Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between economic development and the average level
of education as well as the degree of inequality in the distribution of education, respectively. Ap-
proaching this question in a dynamic panel over 60 years and 143 countries with a system GMM
estimator reveals strong support for the inclusion of an interaction term between the education
Gini coefficient and average years of schooling, indicating the existence of nonlinear effects. We
contribute to the literature in providing strong evidence that more schooling is good for economic
growth - irrespective of its distribution - but that the coefficient is variable and substantially
declining in inequality. On the other hand, inequality is positively related to economic growth for
low average levels of education, whereas highly educated countries exhibit a statistically insignif-
icant negative relationship between inequality and economic growth. From this it follows that at
least a slight increase in the degree of inequality is necessary in order to haul initially poor and
low educated economies out of the poverty trap. However, as economies become educated, the
effect of educational inequality mainly works indirectly. Accordingly, countries that show greater
educational inequality experience lower macro economic returns to education than more equal
economies, on average.
Keywords: education, economic growth, distribution of education.
JEL-Codes: D31, I00, O15.
1 Introduction
The broad concept of human capital comprises aspects inherent in humans, which are - as in the
case of congenital abilities, skills and talent - either given or - as in the case of education, experience
and health - develop over time. In this context education obtained through the formal schooling
system takes on an essential role in linking those two components of human capital. Education is
able to compensate for congenital differences as well as educational gaps arising in early childhood.
Equal access to education therefore secures equality of opportunities. Education also constitutes the
foundation of individuals’ professional careers and affects, among other things, life-time income and
health - thus well-being over the whole life-cycle.1
∗Institute for Fiscal and Monetary Policy and Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital,
Vienna University of Economics and Business
†Universita’ degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale and WU Vienna University of Economics and Business
1As from now we abstract from other components of human capital and use the notions of human capital and
education interchangeable. Moreover, when talking about education we are always considering education obtained
through the formal schooling system. Even if this seems a substantial abstraction, it is not only necessary due to data
limitations but also reasonable as formal education is the component of human capital which can be affected most easily
by policy.
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The aggregate stock human capital is considered a key element in the determination of economic
development. This is true for industrialized countries, where human capital is vital for technology
driven, sustainable development and for developing countries, where education is an essential factor
for hauling societies out of poverty. Therefore, neoclassical and endogenous growth theories have
been attributing peculiar roles to human capital as it brings about technological progress through
positive education externalities (Lucas, 1988), idea creation as a basis for innovation (Romer, 1990),
or imitation and adoption (Nelson & Phelps, 1966).
The link between individual human capital and the aggregate stock of human capital is not straight-
forward but depends on spillovers and the distribution of human capital within an economy. If the
individual returns to education are identical across people and diminishing on the margin (Galor &
Moav, 2004), then a redistribution of education to the less educated would increase the average stock
and productivity of human capital, thus output. But people may differ both in their inherent abilities,
skills and talents as well as their capability to develop them over time. Even if returns to education
are distributed unequally, more equality can lead to an improvement in the average level and the
return to human capital iff the actual distribution is more unequal than the optimal distribution,
where marginal returns are equalized across people. 2 The theoretical literature gives ample evidence
for this possibility (Sauer & Zagler, 2012). In particular, Lo´pez et al. (1998) highlight the imperfect
tradability of education, causing marginal products not to be equalized across individuals and aggre-
gate income to depend not only on the total level but also on the distribution of the respective asset.
It is due to these peculiarities that, in the presence of credit market constraints and human capital
indivisibility, social inheritance of education and/or education externalities, the degree of human cap-
ital inequality negatively affects the average stock of and the macro return to human capital,hence
economic development.
Numerous works have aimed at finding empirical support for the theoretically predicted strong
relation between human capital and economic growth. However, results from introducing various
indicators of education enrollment and attainment into growth regressions turned out to be incon-
clusive. The failure to consistently estimate the macro economic return to education also contrasts
micro econometric evidence which well establishes a positive relation between education and income
at the individual level. Reasoning for this “Education Puzzle” (Lo´pez et al., 1998) has ranged from
econometric issues and deficient quality of schooling data (e.g. Krueger & Lindhal, 2001; Cohen &
Soto, 2007) to the omission of institutions (e.g. Pritchett, 2001) and the quality of education systems
(e.g. Hanushek & Kim, 1995). By showing that differences in the education level of young age groups
2The full spillover and welfare enhancing effects of education are thus not reached at the aggregate level. In this
spirit, Fan et al. (2001, 3) argue: “If people’s abilities are normally distributed, then a skewed distribution of educa-
tion opportunities represents large welfare losses. (...) an equitable distribution of human capital (...) constitutes a
precondition for individual productivity and ability to rise above poverty. Furthermore, an equitable distribution of
opportunities is preferable to a redistribution of existing assets or incomes. This is because education builds new assets
and improves social welfare by its spillover effects, without making anyone worse off. Ensuring access to educational
opportunities by attending to both the supply and demand sides, is a win-win policy gaining support in industrial and
developing countries.”
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explain differences in income per capita significantly better than aggregate measures, Lutz et al. (2008)
provided evidence on the importance of allowing for the demographic dimension of human capital.
Not much attention has been devoted to the distributional dimension so far. If the distribution
of education actually matters but is omitted, however, a negative correlation between educational
inequality and average attainment would cause the macro return to education to be consistently biased
downwards.3 The contribution of this paper is to explicitly include distributional considerations in
the macroeconomic estimation of educational returns, and test whether these macroeconomic returns
differ for different degrees of educational inequality.
We use Barro and Lee’s (2012) education data set and compute Gini coefficients of educational
attainment for a panel of 143 countries ranging from 1950 to 2005 at five-year intervals. We add
this distributional measure to a conventional convergence specification following the augmented Solow
model. However, based on theoretical predictions and empirical facts, we claim that a specification
which properly reveals the relationship between average educational attainment, its distribution and
economic development should allow for a heterogeneous macro economic return to education as well
as non-linearities in the effect of educational inequality. By applying the system GMM estimator
to linear benchmark equations and an interactive specification, we find strong and robust evidence
supporting the presumed non-linear relationship. As this approach has not been applied in empirical
studies so far, it provides new insight into the mechanics and channels of the link between education,
its distribution and economic development. Moreover, it adds to the extensive empirical literature
that deals with computing reliable estimates of the macro return to education.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a survey of the theoretical
literature on the relationship between economic development and the level as well as the distribution
of human capital respectively. Section 3 summarizes existing empirical evidence. Thereafter, we
describe our data and the methodology in sections 4 and 5. Estimation results and robustness tests
are presented in sections 6 and ??. Finally, we conclude in section 7.
2 The Role of Human Capital Inequality in Economic Devel-
opment
Economists have long analyzed the relationship between inequality and growth. Whereas early ap-
proaches underlined the beneficial nature of inequality for economic development, the modern perspec-
tive highlights the potential of inequality to curb economic growth.4 In this line of research, besides
the distribution of wealth and income, the distribution of human capital is considered as forming
an important aspect of the overall degree of inequality within a society. Of primary interest for the
3According to Topel (1999), if distributional aspects of human capital are relatively stable within a country, they are
removed by controlling for country specific effects in a panel data framework. As will be shown in 4, this assumption
does not hold for the sample period under study.
4For good surveys on the literature about the relationship between inequality and growth see Garc´ıa-Penalosa (1994),
Aghion et al. (1999) and more recently Galor (2009).
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study of the relationship between the distribution of education and economic development are partial
equilibrium models explaining the respective link through the human capital accumulation channel,
i.e. approaches that highlight the effect of inequality on education investment decisions and hence on
an economy’s income level. They are able to explain persistent differences in educational attainment
and income within as well as across countries. The concerning literature can be broadly classified into
four lines of research.
First, if credit markets are imperfect or fully absent, initial wealth is the only source for financing
human capital accumulation and poor individuals are constrained in their education investment. In-
equality in the initial distribution of wealth therefore adversely affects the division of the population
between skilled and unskilled labor, i.e. the distribution of human capital, what, in turn, constitutes
the prime source of a society’s failure to exercise its full economic potential in the short as well as in
the long run. (e.g. Galor & Zeira, 1993)
As the credit market imperfection view assumes that education is solely funded privately, it does not
account for the possibility that publicly provided education might mitigate part of the adverse effect
of inequality, a point considered by the political mechanism approach. In general, these works draw on
voting behavior differing across heterogeneous individuals according to their endowment with wealth,
income or human capital. While the majority of earlier studies in this tradition predict a negative
relation between inequality and economic development due to unequal societies voting for inefficient
redistributive policies5, more recent studies point to the welfare-increasing nature of redistributive
policies. In this spirit, Glomm & Ravikumar (1992) show that even if private education is generally
more productive than public education, for inequality levels sufficiently pronounced, median-voter
decisions will result in a public education regime whereby inequality is reduced faster than in the
private regime and average human capital is increasing for some periods. As the society becomes
more equal and educated, the median voter will choose the private education regime, which allows for
approaching a higher steady state income level.
Third, the main idea of a more recent strand of research is that initial differences in individu-
als’ socio-economic background directly translate into heterogeneous education investment decisions.
Based on vast empirical evidence of the importance of students’ socio-economic background in de-
termining educational outcomes, Mej´ıa & Pierre (2008) argue that there are crucial complementary
factors to the process of human capital formation6, that are non-purchasable in the market. Well en-
dowed agents accumulate human capital and provide skilled labor, whereas the badly equipped choose
to supply unskilled labor. Similar to previously presented models, the aggregate outcome hence de-
pends on the relative weight of initially rich to poor dynasties. Moreover, if individual human capital
5See e.g. Alesina & Rodrik (1994), Persson & Tabellini (1994).
6Such factors that complement time and effort in the formation of human capital are race, genes, socio-economic
characteristics and family background variables such as parental education, culture, provision of social connections,
installation of preferences and aspiration in children as well as other factors, e.g. neighborhood and peer effects,
distance to schools, and different qualities of books, teachers and schools, among other things (Mej´ıa & Pierre (2008),
396).
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is subject to decreasing returns to investment, inequality in the distribution of education impairs the
average level and return to human capital. This negative relation persists and compounds in the long
run through the intergenerational transmission of education within dynasties as well as amplifying
relations between education and fertility choices (e.g. Moav, 2005; de la Croix & Doepke, 2003) and/or
life expectancy (e.g. Castello´-Climent & Dome´nech, 2008).
Finally, the fourth line of research introduces human capital externalities, i.e. a mechanism through
which individual education investment decisions not only affect human capital formation of future
generations within dynasties but also across dynasties. Thereby these works serve to explain the
simultaneous evolutionary patterns of the level and the distribution of human capital and economic
development. By introducing the possibility of education costs to decrease with the average stock of
human capital, extensions to the convential credit-constraints approach (e.g. Garc´ıa-Penalosa, 1993)
establish a positive education externality. On the one hand, in rich and high educated countries
where education is relatively cheap, inequality reduces the proportion of people who can afford to
study and hence impairs growth. On the other hand, in poor countries with low levels of average
human capital, a temporary increase in the degree of educational inequality allows for a strong decline
in education costs what enables more people to become educated and accelerates growth for some
periods. In Glomm & Ravikumar (1992), on the other hand, average human capital determines the
quality of public schooling. Higher average human capital therefore increases the return to education
investment for skilled as well as unskilled labor by the same amount and hence accelerates average
human capital accumulation as well as growth. In fact, by inducing spillovers between dynasties, the
human capital externality is what makes public education favorable over private education if inequality
is pronounced. The education externality might also work through the production of goods. According
to Galor and Tsiddon (1997), only for inequality sufficiently low, a global technological externality
which increases everybody’s productivity is released. However, a slight degree of polarization in early
stages of development enables to hit the threshold value of human capital which induces the beneficial
technology shift.
These theoretical approaches have clear and strong empirical implications, generally predicting a
negative relation between inequality in the distribution of education and economic development. The
effect might differ across countries according to their initial stock and distribution of human capital.
A positive relation might result from the possibility of a temporary increase in the degree of inequality
to allow for jumping on a higher growth path. Not only is the distribution of human capital related
to income growth through its effect on human capital accumulation but also through its relation to
the aggregate return to education. That is, the more unequally education is distributed, the lower the
productivity as well as the externality which emerges from education.
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3 Related Empirical Literature
The relationship between the distribution of education and economic performance has been scarcely
explored empirically. One line of research departs from the failure of empirical studies to support
the theoretical implication of a strong causal link from education to growth. The distribution of
education is considered as an omitted variable, whose inclusion should deliver more reliable estimates
of the social return to education.
Lo´pez et al. (1998) use average schooling as well as the standard deviation of educational attain-
ment as explanatory variables in a GDP-per-capita regression. By applying fixed effects estimation
to a panel of 12 Asian and Latin American countries covering the period from 1970 to 1994, they
find a higher degree of inequality in the distribution of education to be significantly negatively re-
lated to GDP per capita. Controlling for distributional aspects as well as for non-linearities reveals
the macro return to average schooling to be most pronounced and significant. Fan et al. (2001) in-
clude the education Gini index into growth regressions. By using fixed as well as random effects
estimation in a panel of 85 countries ranging from 1960 to 1990, they find a significantly negative
relation between the degree of inequality in the distribution of educational attainment and per capita
PPP GDP increments. In a separate regression, the effect of average years of schooling on income
is significantly positive. However, if both schooling variables are included in one regression equation,
the return to average educational attainment remains positive and significant but the education Gini
turns insignificant, indicating average human capital as an important channel linking inequality and
growth.
Another line of research aims at revealing the relationship between the general concept of inequal-
ity and economic development. Castello´ & Dome´nech (2002) compute Gini indices of human capital
for 108 countries from 1960 to 2000, based on Barro and Lee’s (2000) dataset on educational attain-
ment. In order to deepen insight into the relation between inequality and economic development they
use the initial level of their inequality measure in a reduced form equation with average growth in
per capita income from 1960 to 1990 depending on initial income and average accumulation rates of
human and physical capital. All their specifications reveal a significantly negative relationship be-
tween educational inequality and growth. Beyond that, by using physical capital accumulation as the
dependent variable they show that educational inequality is also indirectly related to economic growth
through the accumulation of factors. In their subsequent works (Castello´-Climent & Dome´nech 2008
and Castello´-Climent 2010a), the authors provide evidence for demographic channels to be the most
relevant mechanisms in linking inequality, human capital accumulation and growth.
In his substantial empirical research on inequality and economic development, Castello´-Climent
(2010a, 2010b) succeeds in verifying the strong negative relation between human capital inequality
and income growth, observed in previous cross-section regressions, by estimating a dynamic panel
data model that allows for fixed effects as well as persistent and endogenous regressors. Beyond that,
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the author’s findings suggest the effect of human capital inequality to differ across countries according
to the level of development. While the relationship between the education Gini coefficient and the
per capita income growth rate is significantly negative in low and middle-income countries, it loses
significance in higher-income countries. According to Castello´-Climent (2010b), this result can be
traced back to the fact that the major channels through which inequality is predicted to negatively
affect income growth (i.e. political instability, credit market imperfection, education differentials in
fertility and life-expectancy) are predominantly at work in developing countries.
This work contributes to the presented empirical literature by combing two seminal papers and
adding a third element. First, we continue along the lines of Lo´pez et al. (1998) in computing reliable
estimates of the macro economic return to education which account for the relevance of its distribution
among the population. Second, we follow Castello´-Climent (2010a and 2010b) by controlling for
unobservable individual effects, dynamic panel bias as well as endogenous and persistent explanatory
variables and apply the system GMM estimator. Most importantly, however, we take the theoretical
literature which predicts a nonlinear relationship between inequality and development serious. A
straight forward approach for dealing with heterogeneous coefficients is the inclusion of an interaction
term between the distribution and the average level of human capital.
4 The Data
We construct a panel dataset that contains information on the one hand about real GDP per capita
and variables typically constituting its determinants in a neoclassical growth model, i.e. investment
in physical capital and population growth, and, on the other hand, about the average level as well as
the distribution of educational attainment. Data on real GDP per capita, the share of physical capital
investment in real GDP and population growth are from the current release of Penn World Tables
(PWT 6.3), which provides annual series for 189 countries from 1950 to 2007.7 (Heston et al., 2009)
In order to estimate the degree of inequality in the distribution of human capital we apply the
Gini coefficient as a relative measure of dispersion to the distribution of educational attainment within
a concerned population. Lo´pez et al. (1998) were the first to derive educational Gini coefficients
for 12 countries based on attainment data. Fan et al. (2001) provide a detailed description of the
underlying methodology, calculate educational Gini’s for 85 industrialized and developing countries
for the period from 1960 to 1990 and relate them to average educational attainment, educational
gender-gaps and real GDP per capita. They further extend their sample to 140 countries from 1960
to 2000 in their subsequent work (Fan et al., 2002). Thereafter, their approach has been utilized for
deriving a consistent indicator of the distribution of education 8 , that can be related to, among other
7Real GDP per capita and real investment are based on 2005 constant prices. Real investment includes private as
well as public investment.
8Fan et al. (2002) also calculate Theil indices of educational attainment and Castello´ & Dome´nech (2002), Castello´-
Climent (2010b) additionally report the distribution of education by quintiles.
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things, the distribution of income, e.g. (e.g. Checchi, 2000), and income growth (e.g. Castello´-Climent
2010a and 2010b, Castello´ & Dome´nech 2002 and 2008).
The concept of the Education Gini Coefficient is similar to that of the widely used income Gini,
which is defined “...as the ratio to the mean of half of the average over all pairs of the absolute
deviations between (all possible pairs of) people.” (Deaton 1997 in Fan et al. 2001, 7). At the
macro level, we are usually restricted, however, to information on the duration of formal schooling
categories and the corresponding population shares of educational attainment. All people for whom
an education level is the highest attained, accomplish the same yeas of schooling. Formal education
is hence a categorical rather than a continuous variable. It has a lower boundary at zero years of
schooling, accruing to people without any formal education, and an upper boundary, given by the
cumulative duration of tertiary education. We take all necessary information from the most recent
release of Barro and Lee’s (2012) schooling dataset.9 For each country and time interval the Gini
coefficient is given by,
GE =
N
N − 1
1
µ
6∑
i=1
5∑
j=i
|s˜i − s˜j | aiaj (1)
where µ are average years of schooling of the population aged 15 and over. In accordance with Barro
& Lee (2012), we consider seven categories of educational attainment10 , which are identified by the
indices i and j in (1). ai and aj are the attainment figures corresponding to each schooling level.
s˜i and s˜j depict cumulative years of the duration of formal schooling cycles, which are calculated
from Barro and Lee’s (2012) figures of average years of schooling at each level and the corresponding
attainment data. Depending on country and time period under consideration, formal primary and
secondary schooling cycles vary between three and nine as well as three and eleven years respectively.
By contrast, all countries in the sample feature four years of formal tertiary education. For example,
the education system of the United States features 6, 12 and 16 cumulative years of primary, secondary
and tertiary education respectively. We assume that people who do not complete an education level to
obtain half of the duration of the corresponding education cycles. Finally, the term NN−1 adjusts the
Gini coefficient for small population size. From (1) it becomes clear that the education Gini always
lies in a range between 0 and 1, indicating perfect equality and perfect inequality respectively.
Through the combination of both data sources we derive an unbalanced panel consisting of
143 countries from 1950 to 2005 at five-year intervals, comprising 1383 GDP- and 1716 schooling-
observations. From figure 1 it becomes evident that an overall trend of education expansion, accom-
panied by a reduction of inequality in the distribution of education has taken place over the period
9Their methodological improvements (they exploit information from UNESCO, Eurostat and OECD available at
five-year age intervals, improved their estimation technique for filling in missing observations and use new calculations
of mortality rates by age and education as well as estimates of completion ratios by age) as well as the extended time
and individual dimension has significantly increased quality of educational attainment data. They report attainment
figures ranging from 1950 to 2010 in five-year intervals for the population aged 15 and over, disaggregated by sex and
age.
10(0) no schooling, (1) incomplete primary schooling, (2) complete primary schooling, (3) first cycle of secondary
schooling, (4) second cycle of secondary schooling, (5) incomplete higher education, (6)complete higher education.
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Table 1: Summary statistics (2005)
Average years of schooling Education gini
region obs mean sd min max mean sd min max
total 143 7.83 2.69 1.24 12.91 0.33 0.17 0.05 0.83
Advanced Economies 24 10.4 1.53 6.47 12.91 0.22 0.06 0.1 0.34
Europe and Central Asia 20 10.32 1.08 8.57 12.75 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.26
Latin America and Caribbean 25 7.95 1.56 4 10.14 0.31 0.1 0.12 0.55
East Asia and the Pacific 18 7.87 2.1 3.91 11.47 0.3 0.11 0.17 0.51
South Asia 7 5.3 2.53 3.38 10.8 0.51 0.16 0.2 0.73
Middle East and North Africa 18 7.34 2.11 2.96 11.28 0.4 0.14 0.21 0.73
Sub-Saharan Africa 31 5 2.1 1.24 9.24 0.5 0.18 0.21 0.83
under study. While the distribution of average years of schooling across the sample has been skewed
to relatively low values in 1950, it is skewed towards educational achievement above ten years in 2005.
The distribution is, however, quite spread out and shows a second mode below five years of schooling,
indicating that huge differences across countries still persist. On the other hand, the distribution
of the education Gini coefficient has narrowed and is concentrated at a relatively low value in 2005.
Countries have thus been converging in terms of their educational distribution.
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Figure 1: Kernel Density Estimates
Table 1 reports 2005 summary statistics of average years of schooling and the education Gini.
Across all 143 countries in the sample educational attainment averages at 7.83 years of schooling,
with the respective value for the education Gini being 0.33. The minimum and maximum values
of the concerning schooling variables indicate the existence of huge differences between regions and
countries, though. That is, average schooling ranges from 1.24 years in Mozambique to 12.81 in the
United States. Education is most evenly distributed (GE = 0.05) in the Czech Republic. By contrast,
Niger reports the maximum education Gini of 0.83, accruing from an enormous illiteracy rate of 80%.
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Indeed, high illiteracy rates coincide with high education Gini values. In all countries with education
Ginis greater than 0.5, at least half of the population did not attain any formal education. South
Asian and Sub-Saharan African countries are located at the upper left in the level-distribution plane
(see figure 2). They thus report, on average, the lowest average level of schooling and the highest
degree of educational inequality in 2005. On the contrary, advanced economies as well as European
and Central Asian countries, exhibiting high average educational attainment in conjunction with a low
degree of inequality, are located at the bottom right. The general shape of the relation between the
average level of and the degree of inequality in educational attainment within the remaining regions,
reporting medium values of years of schooling and the education Gini coefficient in 2005, is mainly
driven by high-dynamic countries. That is, the development (see figure 3) e.g. of Iran in the Middle
East, the Republic of Korea in East Asia or Brazil in Latin America was characterized by enormous
educational expansion and a a swift decline in educational inequality. These countries thus feature
values of the concerning schooling variables which span almost the whole plane.
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Figure 2: Average Years of Schooling vs. Education Gini Coefficient by Region
From this it follows that, even if the overall panel relation between years of schooling and the edu-
cation Gini coefficient is negative, the slope changes according to the location in the level-distribution
plane. While it is negative and steep below five average years of schooling, it becomes successively
flatter as the degree of inequality further decreases and the average level of educational attainment
increases. It therefore matters at which level of educational attainment one looks at the relation
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between inequality and growth and, vice versa, at which degree of inequality one looks at the effect of
years of schooling on income growth. Most importantly, however, the within variation differs across
countries, even if their educational conditions have been similar at the beginning of the sample period
(see e.g. Niger and Iran in figure 3). In addition, the relation between average years of schooling
and the education Gini coefficient within countries over time need not to be strictly negative. As
it becomes clear from figure (3), educational inequality remained constant until 1990 in the Czech
Republic. Thereafter, the distribution of educational attainment has gradually become more equal,
as it did the United States. On the other hand, the degree of educational inequality did not change
significantly in the United Kingdom while it increased in France until 1985. Similar levels of average
educational attainment therefore involve different compositions of the educational structure, reflected
in varying degrees of inequality. The analysis of the growth effects of such variations in the educational
Gini coefficient, holding average schooling constant, is thus what is of prime interest for our work.
5 The Method
We investigate the relationship between five year average annual income growth rates, the average level
and the distribution of educational attainment respectively by adopting a conventional convergence
regression,
[ln(Yi,t)− ln(Yi,t−τ )] /τ = α+ β1 ln(Si,t−τ ) + β2GEi,t−τ + γXi,t + i,t (2)
where Yi,t is real GDP per capita in country i in period t and Yi,t−τ is the respective value of the
preceding period t− τ . The dependent variable is therefore the growth rate of real GDP per capita,
measured as annualized averages over the respective time interval τ preceding t, i.e. five years. The
two independent variables of interest, namely the level of human capital, measured as average years
of schooling Si,t−τ , and its distribution, measured by the education Gini coefficient GEi,t−τ introduced
in the previous section, are stock variables of preceding period t− τ . We follow the augmented Solow
model in including a set of control variables11 X, containing the lagged log of real GDP, the log of the
physical capital investment ratio (I/Y )i,t and the log of the population growth rate ni,t. The matrix
of control variables is therefore defined as
Xi,t = {ln(Yi,t−τ ), ln((I/Y )i,t), ln(ni,t)}
The composite error i,t consists of vector of time dummies ξt, a time invariant country specific effect
µi and a remaining idiosyncratic error νi,t of country i in period t.
i,t = ξt + ηi + νi,t
The preceding considerations have given strong indication of the relationship between the distri-
bution of education and economic growth to be non-linear. First, the theoretical literature suggests
11All control variables are measured as annualized averages over four years preceding t.
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Figure 3: Average Years of Schooling vs. Education Gini Coefficient, selected countries
that poor economies may benefit from a transitional increase in educational inequality, whereas rich
economies ceteris paribus may see faster economic growth with a more equal distribution of educa-
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tion. Moreover, the aggregate productivity of education and spillover effects, i.e. the macro return
to education, are predicted to be higher in more equal societies. Second, we have to distinguish a
mechanical from a behavioral relationship. That is, high and low average educational attainment is
associated with low and high values of the education Gini coefficient by construction. In between
these extremes, however, we find within-country developments to be heterogenous. The empirical fact
of a changing slope in the relation between years of schooling and the education Gini necessitates to
control for the average level and the distribution of education when estimating the associated growth
effects. We therefore introduce an interactive specification with a multiplicative (interaction) term
between average years of schooling and the education Gini coefficient,
[ln(Yi,t)− ln(Yi,t−τ )] /τ = α+ β1 ln(Si,t−τ ) + β2GEi,t−τ + δIi,t−τ + γXi,t + i,t (3)
with
Ii,t−τ = ln(Si,t−τ ) ∗GEi,t−τ (4)
The basic specification (2) describes a general relationship between real GDP per capita and the two
schooling variables, i.e. the coefficient on average years of schooling β1 estimates the elasticity of
the growth rate of real GDP per capita with respect to Si,t across all levels of G
E
i,t−τ . Vice versa,
β2 estimates the change in GDP growth associated with a one-unit change in G
E
i,t−τ across all levels
of Si,t−τ . By contrast, non linear models allow for estimating conditional relationships, i.e. the
average effect of Si,t−τ and GEi,t−τ on GDP growth, conditional on particular levels of Si,t−τ and
GEi,t−τ respectively. The coefficient β1 in (3) hence estimates the percentage change in GDP growth
associated with a one-percentage change in Si,t−τ when GEi,t−τ is equal to zero, with the reverse being
true for β2. The coefficient on the multiplicative term δ measures either the change in β1 associated
with a one-unit change in the distribution of education or the change in β2 associated with a one-unit
change in logged average years of schooling.
In both specifications (2) and (3) we are estimating a dynamic model in real GDP per capita, which
allows for country-specific characteristics. Therefore, an appropriate estimation technique should be
able not only to deal with unobservable individual effects but also with the dynamic panel bias.
That is, the lagged dependent variable is necessarily correlated with the country-specific intercept as
well as with the time-varying error. The crucial assumption of strict exogeneity, which requires the
idiosyncratic error to be uncorrelated with all explanatory variables at all time intervals, is thus always
violated in this dynamic framework. Moreover, the issue of endogeneity also arises with respect to the
explanatory variables of our interest. For example, it is reasonable to assume the average level and the
distribution of human capital to be determined simultaneously with income. In addition, by having
more means for investing in education in general as well as for providing high quality public education,
rich economies will not only accumulate a higher stock of human capital but also achieve a more
equitable distribution of educational attainment than poor economies. This issue of reverse causality
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has already been subject to discussion on theoretical as well as empirical grounds (e.g. Bils & Klenow
(2000)). In order to cope with these estimation problems we use the instrumental variable approach
of the system General Method of Moments (GMM), as has initially been proposed by Arellano &
Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998). The basic idea of this method, designed for dynamic
panels with a small time and relatively large individual dimension, is to estimate a stacked system of
equations in first differences and in levels simultaneously. On the one hand, differencing eliminates
unobservable individual effects. The identifying assumption of lagged levels being orthogonal to the
time-varying error enables us to use them as internal instruments for predetermined or endogenous
regressors. On the other hand, the identifying assumption of lagged first differences being orthogonal
to the time-invariant error component makes them valid instruments in the levels equation. We
assume initial GDP per capita to be predetermined so that Yi,t−2τ (and deeper lags) and ∆Yi,t−τ are
available as instruments in the equation in first differences and the levels equation respectively. By
contrast, treating average years of schooling, the Gini coefficient of education and population growth
endogenous necessitates to go one further period back in order to obtain valid instruments.
Consistency of system GMM crucially hinges on identifying assumptions securing the validity of
instruments, i.e. exogeneity of lagged levels and lagged differences in the first difference and the
levels equation respectively as well as serially uncorrelated idiosyncratic errors. In particular the
assumption needed for instruments added by the levels equation to be valid is not trivial, since it
requires stationarity of explanatory variables. Yet Roodman (2006) demonstrates this requirement to
hold if initial deviations from a series’ steady state are uncorrelated with the fixed effect, which is likely
to be the case if a series’ starting point lies far behind the analyzed sample period. If so, stationarity
would be assured even without transforming data into deviations from period means by adding time
dummies, as in (2) and (3). Evaluating if identifying assumptions hold is essential, though. We
therefore report three specification tests. First, the Hanson test of over identifying restrictions tests
the null hypothesis of joint validity of the hole instrument set. Second, the difference-in-Hansen test
tests for the validity of moment conditions added by appending the set of levels equations. Finally,
the third test we perform is the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation, which aims to detect first-
order serial correlation in levels through testing for second-order serial correlation in the residuals in
differences.
The system GMM estimator generates instruments quadratic in the time dimension (T ). The
instrument count can hence easily grow large relative to the sample size as T rises, and may induce
severe finite-sample problems. Typical for all instrumental variable techniques, too many instruments
can overfit endogenous variables, failing to expunge their endogenous components and biasing coef-
ficient estimates (Roodman, 2007). Moreover, the Hansen as well as the difference-in-Hansen test of
instrument validity become weak as instruments become numerous. In order to secure reliability of
estimation results, we therefore limit the instrument set to the first available lag of predetermined and
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endogenous variables respectively.
6 Results
We estimate equations (2) and (3) in a dynamic panel over 60 years and 143 countries with a system
GMM estimator in order to explore the relationship between economic development, average edu-
cational attainment and the degree of educational inequality. Whereas specification (2) follows the
conventional literature, we introduce an interaction term in specification (3). This allows for hetero-
geneity in the effects of schooling and its distribution on economic growth along the average level and
the distribution of education, respectively.
Table 2: Regression results
[ln(Yi,t)− ln(Yi,t−τ )] /τ
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Yi,t−τ ) -0.014 -0.018 -0.011 -0.020
(2.656)*** (3.287)*** (2.121)** (3.139)***
ln(I/Y )i,t 0.022 0.025 0.019 0.022
(2.778)*** (3.284)*** (2.911)*** (3.724)***
ln(ni,t) -0.010 -0.006 -0.003 0.004
(2.464)** (1.659)* (0.927) (1.010)
ln(Si,t−τ ) 0.004 0.000 0.105
(0.634) (0.042) (2.394)**
Gi,t−τ -0.046 -0.031 0.207
(1.381) (0.765) (2.146)**
ln(Si,t−τ ) ∗Gi,t−τ -0.091
(2.459)**
constant 0.028 0.096 0.058 -0.071
(0.902) (1.845)* (1.027) (1.077)
Observations 1,182 1,182 1,182 1,182
Instruments 85 85 103 121
p(AR2) 0.843 0.846 0.882 0.887
p(J) 0.089 0.203 0.109 0.454
p(diff-in-J) 0.291 0.614 0.429 0.975
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Notes: T statistics in parenthesis. Time dummies are included for each 5-year time interval of the sample period from
1950 to 2005. Instruments are the level and the first difference of GDP per capita lagged one period as well as the
level and the first difference of ln(I/Y )i,t, ln(ni,t), ln(Si,t) and Gi,t lagged two periods in the first difference and the
levels equation respectively. The instrument set is restricted to the first lag available. p(AR2) reports the p-value
corresponding to the null of no second order serial correlation in first differences. p(J) and p(diff-in-J) are the p-values
corresponding to the Hansen test for joint validity of instruments and validity of system GMM instruments respectively.
Table 2 summarizes our regression results. We present four specifications. The first specification
reported in column (1) reproduces the conventional growth regression of the augmented Solow model.
The second column substitutes the log of schooling with the Gini coefficient of educational inequality.
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In the third column, we include both the log of schooling to approximate average human capital, and
its distribution. Finally, in the fourth column, we adopt the methodology presented in equation (3)
and add an interaction term between average years of schooling and the education Gini.
In all specifications the coefficient on initial GDP per capita has the expected negative sign, is
of substantial magnitude and significant. Hence conditional convergence is confirmed to be relevant
for the economies building in our sample. Accordingly, countries with higher initial income exhibit
lower growth rates, with the corresponding elasticity ranging from -0.011 to -0.02. In accordance
with theoretical predictions, an increase in population growth curbs economic development. However
we can reject the null hypothesis of no effect of population growth at the 5% significance level only
in the first specification. Investment ratios prove to be significant and exhibit a positive coefficient
throughout all specifications.
When estimating the macro return to education without allowing for distributional aspects we find
the positive effect of average schooling to be insignificant. This confirms results found in the empirical
literature, which note little to no effect of human capital on economic growth. Similarly, even if the
education Gini has the expected negative sign, we do not find a significant impact if average schooling
is not controlled for. Third, including the average level together with the distribution of educational
attainment linearly does not reveal significant effects of the schooling variables either.
Finally, in column (4) of table 2, we introduce the proposed interaction term, thereby testing for the
effect of average schooling to depend on the existing degree of educational inequality and, vice versa,
for heterogeneity in the effect of inequality with respect to the existing level of educational attainment.
Allowing for non-linearities turns out to be crucial as the macroeconomic return to education increases
and turns significant. Moreover, coefficients on the education Gini as well as the multiplicative term are
of substantial magnitude and significant. Both coefficients for average schooling and the educational
Gini are positive, whereas the interaction term is negative. Of particular interest are therefore the
conditional estimates, which we derive from the interactive specification (3) as follows:
δS = β1 + δG
E
i,t−τ (5)
δG = β2 + δ ln(Si,t−τ ) (6)
In order to test for the significance of conditional estimates, we compute conditional t-statistics
based on conditional standard errors which measure the variability of their associated coefficients at
particular levels of the respective variable (Friedrich, 1982). Results for the macroeconomic return
to education conditional on the degree of educational inequality (δS) are presented in figure 4, which
includes both conditional estimates as well es the 5% confidence interval. Accordingly, a one percent
increase in average schooling boosts annual income growth by 0.105% if education is distributed
perfectly equal, i.e. GEi,t−τ = 0. However, with each increase of the education Gini coefficient by one
standard deviation, equal to 0.235, this positive effect is reduced by 0.021 percentage points. Thus, at
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the sample mean, where GEi,t−τ = 0.481, we find that a one-percent increase in average schooling fosters
growth by not more than 0.061% anymore. The effect diminishes substantially from an elasticity of
0.1 at the sample minimum (GEi,t−τ = 0.05) to 0.001 at the sample maximum (G
E
i,t−τ = 0.998) of the
education Gini. With a high degree of educational inequality (GEi,t−τ > 0.75), we can no longer reject
the null hypothesis of no influence of human capital on economic growth, though.
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Figure 4: Conditional Estimates: δS
This result demonstrates that education indeed matters for economic growth, thus presenting a
solution to the education puzzle. However, education matters if and only if it is not distributed
unequally. Below a Gini coefficient of 0.75, an increase in education no longer has a beneficial impact
on economic growth, as education will then only benefit a small elite. The impact of education is
stronger the more equal education is distributed in an economy, thus redistributing education has a
merit if it goes along with an overall increase in the level of education.
Figure 5, on the other hand, gives the conditional estimates of increasing educational inequality
for given levels of schooling. We find that for low levels of education, an increase in inequality
can promote economic growth. At the sample minimum of 0.011 years of schooling, a one standard
deviation deterioration of the Gini coefficient would foster annual economic growth by 0.048 percentage
points. In line with theoretical predictions, it therefore may be attractive to transitionally reallocate
educational resources to more promising students for countries with very low levels of education, so
they can surpass certain educational thresholds and assist in promoting economic growth in their
country.12 We also find that merely redistributing education exhibits no significant effect on economic
12Our result contrasts previous evidence from Castello´-Climent (2010a, 2010b), who finds income growth to be
negatively related to educational inequality in low and middle income countries but insignificant in high income countries.
A possible reason for this disparity is that allowing the effect of inequality to depend on the level of educational
attainment enables to account for differences between countries, even within defined income groups. However, although
the positive relation is supported theoretically, it might be either driven by outliers or by the omission of the demographic
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growth, at least for the range above 3 years and below the sample maximum of 12.81 years of schooling.
The conditional estimate turns negative but remains insignificant above 9 years of education, indicating
that for very high average levels of education (beyond our sample), redistribution of education may
actually lead to an increase in economic growth.
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Figure 5: Conditional Estimates: δG
The middle panel of table 2 reports specification tests peculiar to the system GMM estimator.
Limiting the instrument set to the first available lag of predetermined and endogenous variables re-
spectively enables us to ensure that the number of instruments falls below the number of observations
in each regression. Moreover, the Hansen and the difference-in-Hansen test statistic reveal overall
instruments as well as instruments added through the levels equation to be valid in each specifica-
tion. Finally, p-values of the Arellano-Bond test allow for accepting the H0 of no second-order serial
correlation in first differences.13
Theoretical approaches to the relation between human capital inequality and economic growth
predict the initial degree of inequality to negatively affect average human capital accumulation, thus
the aggregate level human capital and income growth, respectively. This implies the degree of ed-
dimension of inequality. That is, fast educational expansion is associated with a swift increase in educational attainment
of the youth, while attainment of the elderly usually remains constant. The associated unequal distribution between
age cohorts, reflected in higher education Gini values, thus imply a positive growth effect. A consistent analysis of
educational inequality within and across age groups would therefore be an important aspect for further research.
13We have also analyzed the effects of forgoing the restriction of the instrument set. Using the first as well as
all deeper lags available in the difference equation boosts the instrument count up to 292 and 346 in the linear and
non-linear specification respectively. This distorts estimation considerably since, in general, all schooling variables of
interest are not significant. Most importantly, testing for the validity of instruments consistently delivers implausibly
high p-values of 1, what indicates weakness of the Hansen as well as the difference-in-Hansen test. The instrument
count and specification tests are still not satisfactory if we limit the instrument set of endogenous variables but allow
for deeper lags of the predetermined variable. However, estimation results converge to those obtained by using the fully
limited instrument set as coefficients on the relevant variables are of quite similar magnitude and marginally statistically
significant. The fact that results improve as the instrument count is being reduced strengthens the robustness of our
preferred estimation outcomes.
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ucational inequality to impact growth with a substantial time lag rather than simultaneously with
average educational attainment, as it is implied by specifications (2) and (3). We thus allow for the
education Gini coefficient one lag further behind, i.e. GEi,t−2τ . The results from rerunning our regres-
sions accordingly, are presented in columns (1) to (3) of table 3. As before, our evidence strongly
indicates non-linearities in the relationship between years of schooling, the education Gini and eco-
nomic growth. Indeed, the coefficients on the concerning schooling variables are not only higher in
magnitude, compared to column (4) of table 2, but also significant at the one percent significance
level. This provides support for the presumed lagged channel linking human capital inequality and
economic growth.
In order to further assure the robustness of our results we successively eliminate control variables
from the regressions (see columns (4) to (11) of table 3). On the one hand, spurious regression indi-
cates that educational inequality might also be indirectly related to growth through a boosting effect
on fertility rates, thus population growth. This is in line with theoretical works building on differ-
ential fertility choices between the well and the low educated for explaining the relationship between
educational inequality and growth. The education Gini might also pick up information of population
growth, as countries with an unequal distribution tend to be countries that have high population
growth rates, on average. However, even if the education Gini coefficient becomes slightly significant
at the 10% level in column (5) and the coefficients of schooling variables decrease in magnitude in the
interactive specification, our prime results do not change substantially. On the other hand, Castello´
& Dome´nech (2002) have noted that educational inequality could also be indirectly related to income
growth through the accumulation of factors. In fact, educational inequality is significant and nega-
tively related to income growth if neither the pysical capital investment share nor average schooling
are allowed for. In this case, a one standard deviation increase in the education Gini coefficient reduces
annual growth by 0.025 %. Moreover, the magnitude of the estimated variable effects of schooling and
its distribution are higher in column (8) than in column (4) of table 2. Due to the presumed negative
relation between inequality and educational attainment as well as physical capital investment, it is
most likely that these estimates are substantially biased upwards, though. In general, we therefore
find that our main result which strongly supports the accountance for non-linearities hold, even in
presence of spurious regression.
7 Summary and Conclusions
This paper had two main objectives. First, we aimed at demonstrating that education matters for
economic growth. Despite seeming obvious, the empirical literature has so far failed to provide sound
evidence. Second, we sought to find evidence on the relevance of the distribution of education for
economic development. Theoretical approaches to economic growth which account for distributional
aspects generally predict the degree of human capital inequality to negatively affect income growth
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through the channel of human capital accumulation. But theory also provides indication not only
for for the effect to differ across countries according to the average level of human capital but also
for the macroeconomic return to education to vary with the degree of educational inequality. Our
central hypothesis has therefore been that a specification which properly reveals the relationship
between average educational attainment, its distribution and economic development should allow for a
heterogeneous macroeconomic return to education as well as non-linearities in the effect of educational
inequality.
By adding the education Gini coefficient and average years of schooling to a conventional conver-
gence specification and applying the system GMM estimator to linear benchmark equations, we found
results to be satisfactory with respect to lagged income, investment shares and population growth,
but saw little to no evidence for the impact of schooling and its distribution on economic growth.
The introduction of an interaction term between the education Gini coefficient and years of schooling
has turned out to be crucial in understanding the relevance of educational inequality for economic
development. Doing so reveals, first, that the coefficient on average schooling increases and becomes
significant as the appropriate functional form is being estimated. The failure to allow for distribu-
tional aspects and to recognize the flexible coefficient may be the reason for unsatisfactory results
in previous studies. Education exhibits a positive and impact that is substantially declining in the
inequality of education. Accordingly, countries that show greater educational inequality experience
lower macroeconomic returns to education than more equal economies, on average. Second, we find
the relation between educational inequality and income growth to be positive for relatively low ed-
ucational attainment. Thus, in accordance with the theoretical literature, at least a slight degree of
inequality is necessary in order to haul an economy out of a poverty trap. The effect becomes, how-
ever, insignificant as economies become more educated. The conditional relationship between average
educational attainment and income growth uncovers that instead of being directly related to growth,
educational inequality negatively affects economic growth indirectly through its dampening effect on
the macroeconomic return to education. From this it follows that the existence of constraints to the
equalization of marginal individual returns to education inhibits the aggregate productivity of human
capital. Moreover, inequality in the distribution of education constitutes a border to education ex-
pansion and the associated externalities, as they emerge e.g. from the quality and cost of schooling
or from technological spillover effects.
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